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CASENOTE; In re Conservatorship of Minor Children: When Dad is
the Defendant, Who Gets to Parent?
Caitlin S. Williams
I. INTRODUCTION
The right of a parent to raise his child is fundamental, and courts
are reluctant to impede on that right when determining the best interests of
a child.1 In In re Conservatorship of Minor Children,2 the Montana
Supreme Court was faced with deciding whether to appoint a guardian ad
litem on behalf of three children for the purpose of potentially pursuing
litigation against their father.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2012, Michael and Jennifer Soule, parents of J.S., K.S.,
and R.S., were involved in a car accident that resulted in Jennifer’s death.3
Michael was charged with both vehicular homicide and driving under the
influence, although the charges were ultimately dismissed for various
reasons.4 Despite the charges, Michael maintained he could not recall who
was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.5 Safeco insured the
vehicle involved in the accident and disbursed the policy limit of $300,000
to the Soule’s three children.6 The children’s maternal grandfather was
appointed as conservator only to the extent of overseeing the settlement
disbursement, and the district court appointed an attorney, Benjamin Alke,
to represent the children in respect to the settlement.7 In his role as the
children’s advocate, Mr. Alke recognized a potential lawsuit against their
father as well as his business, which carried an insurance policy limit of
$1,000,000.8 Mr. Alke then petitioned for the appointment of a guardian
ad litem to determine if pursuing further litigation was in the children’s
best interests.9 Michael Soule objected to the appointment, as he argued
that additional litigation would further traumatize his children.10 Prior to
the hearing regarding the appointment of a guardian ad litem, the eldest of
the Soule children attempted suicide.11 The district court then appointed
retired Judge Dorothy McCarter as guardian ad litem to determine if
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further litigation was in the children’s best interests, and appointed Mr.
Alke as the children’s attorney for the purpose of pursuing any such
claims.12 Michael Soule then appealed to the Montana Supreme Court
regarding the district court’s appointment of a guardian ad litem.13
III. MAJORITY HOLDING
The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s holding
both for abuse of discretion and in consideration of the children’s best
interests.14 The Court divided the issue before it into three parts: “whether
the appointment of a guardian for the purpose of considering and possibly
pursuing litigation was an abuse of discretion, whether authorizing the
guardian to undertake certain duties was an abuse of discretion, and
whether the appointment was in the children’s best interests.”15
A. Abuse of Discretion
The Court first analyzed the statutes under which guardians can
be appointed, including Mont. Code Ann. § 25–5–301, which allows
appointment of a guardian when litigation is in contemplation and the
minor is a plaintiff,16 and Mont. Code Ann. § 41–1–202, which affords
minors the same rights as adults when acting through a guardian.17 The
Court reconciled the two statutes by analyzing the statutory construction
and adhering to the principle that “[a]n interpretation of a statute which
gives it effect is preferred to one which makes it void.”18 The Court
reasoned that in order for a minor to have the same rights as an adult, and
in order for a minor to be a plaintiff in litigation, the minor must be able
to commence litigation through a guardian ad litem.19 The Court held that
since the guardian ad litem in the instant case was indeed appointed in
contemplation of litigation, the district court did not abuse its discretion.20
The Court further identified that not only was litigation against their father
a possibility, but if the children were to pursue those claims, they could
only do so through a guardian ad litem.21
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B. Duties of the Guardian ad Litem
Since the statute authorizing appointment of a guardian in
contemplation of litigation involving a minor does not list the duties of
said guardian, the Court looked instead at the duties of a guardian in
reference to child custody and support proceedings.22 The statute
governing guardians in those instances identifies the guardian’s duties as:
(a) to conduct investigations that the guardian ad litem considers necessary
to ascertain the facts . . . ; (b) to interview or observe the child or who is
the subject of the proceeding; . . . (d) to appear and participate in all
proceedings to the degree necessary to adequately represent the child and
make recommendations to the court . . . ; and (e) to perform other duties
as directed by the court.23
The Court reasoned that a guardian ad litem representing minor
children in potential litigation against their father would utilize “[s]imilar
investigatory and representative functions”24 as a guardian in a child
support or custody proceeding, and thus those duties would be considered
in analyzing the district court’s appointment of a guardian.25 The district
court appointed the guardian to determine if pursuing further litigation was
in the children’s best interests, to communicate with the children’s family
members regarding such claims, and to access the children’s information
to the extent necessary to pursue litigation.26 The Supreme Court held that
those duties were consistent with those listed in the aforementioned
statute, and thus the district court’s authorization of the guardian to
perform such duties was not an abuse of discretion.27
C. The Children’s Best Interests
The final consideration in analyzing whether the district court
abused its discretion was to determine if the appointment of a guardian ad
litem was in the best interests of the children.28 The guardian was
appointed pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 25-5-301, which offers no
guidance as to what the best interests of the children are.29 As a result, the
Court again looked to another title within the Montana Code Annotated
for instruction, namely the Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”).30 The UPC
states that “[t]he court may appoint as guardian any person whose
22
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appointment would be in the best interests of the minor.”31 The Court
interpreted that provision in In re Krause32 to mean “that the person
appointed must not have interests adverse to those of the child.”33 In the
instant case, the Court had to determine whether the decision to pursue
further litigation on behalf of the children should be made by the children’s
father or by a guardian ad litem.34 Michael Soule objected to the
appointment of the guardian, arguing that as the children’s father he was
in the best position to determine what the best interests of the children
were.35 However, the Court recognized that because Michael and his
business would be the adverse parties if further litigation was pursued, his
decisions may stem more from protecting his interests than considering
the best interests of his children.36 For that reason, the Court upheld the
district court’s decision to appoint a guardian ad litem over Michael’s
objection.37
IV. JUSTICE MCKINNON’S DISSENT
Justice McKinnon dissented from the majority opinion, stating she
would have held the District Court abused its discretion by appointing a
guardian ad litem.38 The majority interpreted Mont. Code Ann. § 25–5–
301 as allowing a minor to commence litigation through a guardian so as
to give effect to Mont. Code Ann. § 41–1–202, which affords minors the
same rights as adults when acting through a guardian.39 Justice McKinnon,
on the other hand, argued that the plain language of Mont. Code. Ann. §
25–5–301 only allows appointment of a guardian when a minor is a party
to a case.40 She further argues that “[t]here is no authority for a court to
appoint a guardian ad litem for minor children, against the wishes of the
children’s only surviving parent, when no proceeding is pending before
the court.”41 Justice McKinnon also acknowledged the novelty of the
majority’s holding, noting“[w]e have never appointed a guardian ad litem
absent a pending proceeding simply for the purpose of allowing the
guardian ad litem to investigate potential claims against a parent who is
fit.”42 Justice McKinnon also disagreed with the scope of the guardian’s
duties, arguing the guardian ad litem’s initial duties were related to “a

31

MONT. CODE ANN. § 72–5–223.
19 P.3d 811 (Mont. 2001).
33
In re Minor Children, 362 P.3d at 80 (citing In re Krause at 814).
34
Id. at 78.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 80–81.
37
Id. at 81.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 79.
40
Id. at 81
41
Id.
42
Id.
32

2016

CASENOTE: IN RE CONSERVATORSHIP

35

limited conservatorship proceeding”43 for the purpose of overseeing the
Safeco settlement disbursement.44 McKinnon argues any role beyond
those related to the Safeco settlement unnecessarily intrudes into the
private lives of Michael Soules and his children.45 Additionally, she argues
that since the Court did not deem Michael Soules as an unfit parent, “there
is no justification for appointment of a guardian ad litem to usurp a father’s
decisions regarding what is in his children’s best interests.”46 McKinnon
also recognized the potential impact that further litigation will have on the
children, noting they will likely be involved in the discovery process “as
they are peculiarly situated to know the habits and customs of their parents,
particularly as they relate to who might have been driving.”47 Justice
McKinnon concluded her dissent by acknowledging that parents are often
faced with making difficult decisions on behalf of their children that result
in a conflict of interest.48 She cited to two United States Supreme Court
decisions that clarify and enforce an individual’s fundamental right to
parent his children, and the states’ reluctance to infringe upon that right.49
V. ANALYSIS
While the majority offered a detailed walk-through of the statutory
authority used to reach its decision, the dissent identified several flaws and
consequences of the ultimate outcome. Additionally, there are three
underlying issues in this case that were not fully explored in the opinion:
(1) the father was not deemed unfit and therefore unable to make decisions
on behalf of his children; (2) the majority uses guardianship statutes from
several different titles within the Montana Code Annotated; and (3) the
opinion did not discuss how the minor children actually wished to proceed.
A. Fitness of the Father
The majority effectively argued appointing a guardian ad litem
was necessary because the father’s interests “are by definition potentially
adverse to those of his children because he and his business would be
named defendants in a lawsuit filed on their behalf.”50 However, as noted
both by the majority and in Justice McKinnon’s dissent, there was no
evidence offered or determination made that Michael Soule was an unfit
parent.51 The fact that Michael Soule is considered a fit parent is
43
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significant because fit parents are presumptively able to make decisions
that serve the best interests of their children.52 So although Michael Soule
is considered a fit parent who can make decisions on behalf of his minor
children in every other respect, in these proceedings his fitness as a parent
was insufficient when deciding whether to subject his children to further
litigation. Although the majority acknowledged Michael Soule was a fit
parent, it did not reconcile the inconsistency arising from the conclusion
that he is not able to make a decision on behalf of his children that is truly
in their best interests. This case poses an interesting exploration into when
the state can impose its own judgment as to the best interests of a child in
lieu of that child’s parent. And as noted in Justice McKinnon’s dissent,
this case also marks the Montana Supreme Court’s first appointment of a
guardian ad litem to represent minor children in the contemplation of
litigation as opposed to when proceedings are actually pending. Given the
state’s typical reluctance to impede upon the fundamental right of a fit
parent to raise his children, it is interesting that this Court did not trust the
father to put the interests of his children above his own interests in light of
a conflict of interest.
B. Concerns Regarding Title-Hopping
Although the majority effectively explained its reasoning for
utilizing guardianship statutes from various titles within the Montana
Code Annotated, there remains an underlying concern when an
appointment of a guardian relies on statutory authority that does not
directly stem from the statute used to appoint the guardian in the first
place. The guardian was initially appointed under Mont. Code Ann. § 25–
5–301,53 which lies under the “Civil Procedure” title of the Code.
However, since the statute did not specifically address whether a minor
can commence litigation through a guardian, the Court then turned to
Mont. Code Ann. § 41–1–202,54 which lies under the “Minors” title of the
Code. Since neither of the aforementioned statutes listed the duties of a
guardian, the Court then looked to Mont. Code Ann. § 40–4–205,55 which
falls under the “Family Law” title of the Code, and more specifically, the
chapter concerning child custody and support. Lastly, in order to identify
what the best interests of the children were, the Court cited Mont. Code
Ann. § 72–5–22356 under the “Estates, Trusts, and Fiduciary
Relationships” title of the Code. The latter statute falls under the chapter
governing “persons under disability guardianship and conservatorship”
under the Uniform Probate Code. The Court ultimately used statutes from
52
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four different titles of the Montana Code Annotated in reaching its
decision. Although the Court sufficiently explained its reasoning in tying
the different statutes together, there is an inescapable conclusion that no
one statute was sufficient on its own to justify the holding. The elements
identified and utilized by the Court were drafted and intended to be
interpreted within its specific title, so applying the statute to a context
outside of that title carries a risk that it will be misconstrued.
C. The Children’s Actual Best Interests
Despite the care and attention given to determining who best will
represent the children’s best interests, at no point in the opinion are the
children’s actual, stated wishes addressed. Although an attorney was
appointed to advocate for the children’s stated interests, and a guardian ad
litem was appointed to advocate for the children’s best interests, neither
the Court nor the district court directly discussed the children’s opinions
as to whether they wished to pursue legal claims against their father or his
business. Although the children now have an attorney and a guardian ad
litem advocating for them, one would think the children’s actual stated
wishes as to pursuing litigation against their father would at the very least
be addressed in the opinion, especially in light of the eldest child’s recent
attempt on his own life. The voices of minors in proceedings that directly
impact their lives have historically been muffled by adults who seek to
advocate for them. This holding lies consistent with that trend. Given the
tragic circumstances that brought this case to court and the peculiar
circumstances that may pit the children against their father, one can only
hope the adults that have been entrusted with deciding how to proceed will
do so with the children’s opinions in mind.

